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The Balkan states are relatively young nation-states that achieved independence through a 
succession of bloody wars, either civil (the dissolution of Yugoslavia after the fall of 
Communism), regional (the Balkan wars at the turn of the 19th-20th century) and/or global (the 
end of two world wars). All of them now claim, or aspire, to be modern, democratic and secular 
states, and are on their way to integration with the more ‘mature’ Western European 
counterparts. The debate about progress of democratization and their capacities to integrate into 
the EU has brought to the fore issues of political ‘maturity’ in terms of good governance, and the 
protection of minorities and other human rights. The harsh and sometimes bloody legacy of 
nation- and state-formation, amidst plural ethno-religious divisions, seemed to be an impediment 
for achieving the status of democratic states. Religious and ethnic tensions were seen as 
particularly worrying. Specifically, these states had to face simultaneously at least two major 
constraints: on the one hand, guaranteeing religious freedom and equal treatment for all citizens; 
on the other hand, holding on to the religion of the nation, which had kept the nation intact when 
the state disappeared. After 1990, the challenge then was to set up new institutional compromises 
and suitable balances that could combine (1) religious freedom, (2) state neutrality and (3) the 
majoritarian or ‘traditional’ basis of nationhood.1 
 
 
Democratic Freedoms and Historical Legacies  
 
The articles in this special issue show that historical legacies are not always harmful. There are 
plenty of data here to demonstrate that certain legacies of homogenous nation-state-building and 
states’ sticking to majoritarian biases and religious symbols hamper the easy introduction of 
democratic standards. Yet, what is probably neglected is that the formalization of, and even more 
so habitation to, new values of religious freedom and state neutrality have never been an easy or 
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fast process also elsewhere in the more ‘mature’ democratic world. Post-communist Balkan 
states have managed to create new institutional balances and a more equal playing field for all 
religious communities with relative ease when compared to the lengthier and still contested 
process in Western European states. Not only has the formal challenge of legalizing religious 
freedom and state neutrality been quite successfully fulfilled, but the historical past has 
seemingly provided these states with suitable experiences to accommodate various religious 
groups, especially Muslims.  
 
After the fall of Communism, all the countries under analysis demonstrate ample institutional 
attempts to expand the range of religious freedoms and the state’s equal treatment of all 
denominations, including the Islamic community. Cases show difficulties in adjusting to new 
standards, but there are no real cases of religious discrimination. Even when the state, as in most 
Christian Orthodox polities, extend formal and informal privileges to the dominant religion and 
to its church, these favors go hand in hand with the institutionalization of an equal playing field 
for all. Muslim-majority Albania is a particularly interesting case, which has consensually 
embraced the ideal of an equidistant state towards all religious views, as the most suitable 
template to deal with plurality.2 The next state that has paid ‘extra’ attention to management of 
plurality is post-Dayton Bosnia. Here, the post-war legal framework has endorsed multiple 
guarantees of religious freedom and equality for all the constituent communities.3 Post-
Communist Bulgaria has recognized the traditional role of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, but 
also provided ample individual and collective guarantees to diverse sections of its Muslim 
community.4 At the other end of the spectrum is Turkey, where the Sunni-majority, embedded 
into the governing state structures, dominates the religious life of the country. That the country is 
run by a Sunni-rooted governing majority for over a decade now, did not help to even out the 
legal/institutional disparity among different religious groups and their claims.5  
 
Nonetheless, existing tensions are more about ethnic minorities than religious minorities. In other 
words, tensions are not about the religious practices of these minorities, but about their socio-
political claims and/or their links and loyalty to other political entities. This is an important 
difference even when compared to the effects of open model of managing plurality in India, 
where ongoing attacks randomly target the practices and symbols of ‘others’. But, this is also 
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different from Western Europe where current clashes involving populations with a migrant 
background concentrate more and more on their religious practices such as the veil, prayers, 
hallal food and/or desecration of sacred places. In this sense the Balkan states, proved better 
suited to deal with the plurality of religious practices in the public sphere, specifically Muslim 
practices, than their Western European counterparts. 
 
New legal standards of freedom and equality have helped. But, obviously there is much more to 
it. The main reason is that this ‘coexistence’ of plurality is the result of a long historical process 
of dealing with tensions, exchanges and coexistence that have made Islam a ‘local’ religion, the 
same way that Protestantism became a ‘local’ religion after the traumatic break-up of the unified 
Catholic world by the Lutheran Reformation, particularly in Germany. To sum up, tensions about 
religious differences between Albanians, Serbs, Bosniaks, Turks or Bulgarians do not concern 
the practice of their respective religion. These practices are familiar to each other: there is a 
social knowledge of practices of other  religions that is not found in Western Europe. Put 
differently, the other is still an ‘other’ but a more familiar one. 
 
 
Equality, Identity and Faith 
 
Nevertheless freedom of religion does not always mean equality between religions, and this 
holds true both in the Balkans and in Western Europe, irrespective of the wording of the various 
constitutions. Most countries have a dominant religion, and a dominant church, especially in 
Christian Orthodox countries. The church enjoys political privileges, is associated with national 
celebrations, and is conferred a special socio-political role. Contrary to what may happen in 
Greece or Turkey through mandatory religious teaching at school, however, such privileges do 
not necessarily amount to a systematic effort to encourage individuals’ particular religious 
practices or commitment to a church. Privileges awarded to a specific church are more a way to 
stress cohesive national identity than to propagate faith and participation in weekly mass. The 
emphasis on an official religion is more a matter of identity, than faith. 
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In a sense we can see a rapprochement of Balkan states with Western Europe here. Even when 
there is no an official state or a national religion, the states under analysis have attempted to 
organize and watch over collective expressions of national identities and their intimate 
connections to specific churches. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the 
European Commission, meanwhile, have regularly accused specific Catholic Orthodox countries 
for acts of religious discrimination; for example, to remedy discrimination, the ECtHR requested 
Greece to remove religion from identification cards. However, recent ECtHR decisions have 
endorsed the states’ right to recognize one religion as an expression of a national identity or 
culture, by allowing for instance Italian schools to display the crucifix but not symbols of other 
religions. In doing so, the ECtHR recognizes the concept of a dominant national culture and 
condones the concept of multiple secularities. In other words, the state’s adoption of a dominant 
culture does not clash with secularism, but is a form of different secularisms. The ECtHR’s 
approach also hinges on the contingent, home-grown virtues of different models. Indeed, there is 
no ‘best’ template of secularism to follow, be it the US ‘wall of separation’, French ‘laïcité’ or 
the open-negotiated Indian arrangements. Instead, different states developed various historical- 
and context-specific interpretations of secularism, which reverberate the religious and political 
necessities of time and place. The Balkan states are no exception. All cases here provide ample 
evidence of contingent models of secularisms coming of age. From Albania, to Bosnia, to 
Bulgaria and Turkey, democratizing polities have opted for different arrangements to 
accommodate and regulate their respective Muslim communities in the context of religious 
diversity.  
 
 
State Supervision and Bureaucratization of Religion 
 
Another commonality between the Balkan states is that they all established some sort of state 
supervision of the religious sphere, most often by organizing, recognizing, and collaborating 
with one nationwide institution representing  the respective religious community. Specifically, 
all countries analyzed privilege the role of hierarchical Muslim organizations endowed with the 
sole authority in administering all administrative and spiritual matters concerning the Muslim 
community. What is often a legacy of previous non-democratic regimes, this ‘bureaucratization’ 
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of religion seems at odds with a liberal-democratic approach that would explicitly prohibit state 
interference in the way religions organize and run themselves. Here too broad precepts of liberal 
theories might not be the best lens to analyze practical institutional solutions for coping with 
religious plurality in different contexts. States often face the mounting challenge of 
accomodating various religious claims and hands-off neutrality does not suffice to arbiter such 
claims or ensure that they indeed adhere to a common denominator of common good - be it 
peace, democracy, security, safety and a plural home for all.  One should also acknowledge that 
liberal Western European states are on the path to pushing for the establishment of state-
recognized representative Islamic organizations. In these cases, this is rarely a legacy of the past, 
but more a practical institutional solution to thwart uncontrolled diffusion of radical Islamic 
groups and bring them into the fold of the state. In any case, it amounts to a new kind of 
compromise between the state and an incoming religious community. It opens up the possibility 
to negotiate with religious movements which do not feel part of the historical compromises that 
different states have, more or less painfully, set up among themselves and the dominant religious 
groups, from Concordat to laïcité and to established churches. 
  
From the Balkans to Western Europe, we can thus witness the development of new forms of state 
intervention in the management of Islamic communities and religious diversity more broadly. 
The difference between Western Europe and the Balkans is that the former is striving to establish 
this new kind of control under the pressure of recent immigration and the current events linked 
with Islamic radicalism, without a long-term perspective and with few historical precedents. In 
contrast, Balkan countries have, since their foundation in the 18th and 19th century, emerged as  
multi-religious and multi-ethnic polities, which confronted them early on with the question of 
accommodating Muslim communities within their plural societies. Given that they confronted 
the ‘problem’ at least one century ahead of their European counterparts, they offer some useful 
guidance on models for governing Islam in plural contexts, with all their faults and attributes. In 
this sense, a European ‘local’ Islam already exists and that is in the Balkans.  
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